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Chapter 7
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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the analysis of the utilitarian model of the 
explanation of popular support for Croatian entry into the European 
Union. The utilitarian model for explicating support or lack of support 
for accession to the EU has been analysed through subjective principled 
expectations of benefits and harms of entry into the Union at a personal 
and at a national level, and through concrete expectations at the level 
of twenty-two aspects of social and economic life. The research results 
show that on the basis of principled expectations it is possible precisely 
to predict support for entry into the EU, but that the principled expecta-
tions are not to any very great extent founded on concrete expectations 
in the observed aspects of social and economic life, and that they are 
to a certain degree linked with political viewpoints. On the other hand, 
concrete expectations are relatively weakly correlated with support for 
Croatian entry into the EU. Such a result suggests the conclusion that 
on the basis of a utilitarian explanation of support it is possible only 
relatively poorly to predict viewpoints concerning joining the EU, and 
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that principled expectations of benefits and harms are in good part an 
expression of general impressions about the EU, trust in the political 
elite and political views of Croatian citizens, and to a lesser extent reali-
stic rational calculations of harms and benefits. The paper is based on 
empirical survey of the views and expectations performed on a proba-
bilistic national sample of a thousand citizens older than 15. 
Key words:
European Union, utilitarian explanation of attitudes toward accession, 
analyses of harms and benefits, political attitudes, Croatia
INTRODUCTION 
Since mid-2003 there have been considerable changes in the atti-
tudes of Croatian citizens to accession to the EU. According to Puls 
agency investigations of mid-2003, about three quarters of Croatian cit-
izens then supported Croatian accession, after which, from the autumn 
of the same year, the process of a decline in support began. Through 
several phases, the process of a weakening of public support for the in-
tegration of Croatia into the EU has arrived at the critical level of today, 
when the number of those who are against is equal to, and sometimes 
even higher than, that of those who are for Croatian membership.
Several explanations for the downward trends in public support 
in Croatia for EU accession have been tendered at various levels of ab-
straction, which can be more or less subsumed under the approaches 
that are met in the relevant professional literature. Rachel Cichowski 
(2000) says that in the literature that deals with the first three waves of 
enlargement (finishing with the entry of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
in 1995) it is possible to identify three approaches to an explanation 
of public support for the integration of a country into the EU: utilitar-
ian, valued-based and economic and political issue-based. The utilitar-
ian explanation is based on the hypothesis that the individual attitude 
to European integration stems from a profit and loss analysis vis-à-vis 
quality of life. The value-based explanation assumes that certain value 
orientations, such as post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1970) are more 
“fertile ground” for the acceptance of integration processes than other 
value orientations. The third explanation is based on the assumption 
that a positive macroeconomic situation and positive trends have a pos-
itive effect on the assessment of the processes that brought them about 
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and hence it is possible accordingly to explicate the pro or contra views 
of citizens to European integration. Political reasons are also to be add-
ed to this list of reasons for support or lack of support for European in-
tegration, such as the relation between national and supranational insti-
tutions, and the theory of social capital. A political explanation appears 
in several sub-versions. Sànchez-Cuenca (2000) suggests that the level 
of trust in national institutions is in inverse proportion to trust in supra-
national institutions and hence to the level of support for accession to 
the EU. According to this explanation, citizens look for some institu-
tional authority that is capable of settling their problems. If domestic 
institutions are capable of this, supranational institutions are not nec-
essary, and conversely, when national institutions do not perform their 
functions at a satisfactory level, hope is channelled towards the Euro-
pean institutions. Anderson (1998) suggests three types of political ex-
planation that correlate citizen views about domestic political institu-
tions and actors and views about European integration. The first type of 
argument suggests an opposite correlation between trust in national and 
supranational institutions than that found in Sànchez-Cuenca (2000), 
which means that it is proportional. This is backed up with the propo-
sition that citizens use their own government and national institutions 
as a proxy or example or model via which they make judgements con-
cerning supranational institutions concerning which they have far less 
knowledge and information. The fact that two authors give diametri-
cally opposite explanations of the ways in which perception of national 
institutions affect attitudes about the EU can be explained by the diver-
sity of the contexts with which they are concerned. Anderson is mainly 
concerned with the older members and Sànchez-Cuenca with the transi-
tion countries, in which the EU is seen as an ideal as compared with the 
young and undeveloped national institutions. Anderson’s second prop-
osition implies the existence of a directly proportional link between 
trust in the domestic government and support for European unity. This 
can be explained by the fact that those mainly spearheading European 
integration are officials of the governments of the member countries 
(and candidates) and trust in them as domestic political actors is pro-
jected onto trust in the processes of European integration that they are 
heading. The third argument links support for traditional political par-
ties as compared with new parties that appear on the political scene as 
an expression of resistance to the policies that are implemented by the 
traditional parties, and views about European integration. This hypoth-
esis posits that electors who support traditional political parties support 
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the processes of European integration to a greater extent because it is 
these parties that are heading the process. An explanation based on the 
concept of social capital implies that individuals who have greater so-
cial capital and are more open to cooperation and association in every-
day life will also more easily accept the idea of European integration 
(Rimac and Štulhofer, 2003).
All these approaches certainly explain part of the whole pro-
cess of attitude formation among citizens concerning European inte-
gration, but they are not all equally applicable to the understanding of 
the sudden changes in the views of citizens about the entry of a coun-
try into the EU. Explanations that are based on long-term and relatively 
recalcitrant characteristics, such as value orientations or quantity of so-
cial capital, can be employed with difficulty to explain the sudden fall 
of public support for Croatian accession to the EU of some 30-40%. 
These explanations would have to posit the occurrence of earthshaking 
social changes that in a relatively short period of time have altered val-
ue orientations and the amount of social capital. An explanation of sud-
den change can more convincingly be based on one of the approaches 
using changing social phenomena, such as perception of the domestic 
government, trust in domestic or European institutions or perception of 
the harms and benefits of EU accession. 
An unsystematic analysis of Croatian public discourse about 
European integration leaves the impression that the utilitarian perspec-
tive is one of the dominant angles from which the process of European 
accession is observed. If an analysis of the contents of newspaper ar-
ticles and the public statements of politicians and analysts were made, 
probably it would be found that in the context of EU accession, most 
of the discussion is couched in terms of harms and benefits, even when 
the many motives for a negative attitude are actually to be found in the 
sphere of political views. Political actors expect citizens to perceive the 
harms and benefits of entry into the EU and therefore think that in the 
event of a referendum on this issue they would make their decisions 
pursuant to rational cost-benefit calculations. Of course, the possibil-
ity of a rational calculation of cost-benefits on the part of most citizens 
is quite restricted for several reasons: lack of basic information about 
the way the EU works; lack of interest in information about integration 
processes (Anderson, 1998); lack of information about the dimensions 
of changes that happen as a consequence of EU accession; the impos-
sibility of a rational calculation of pros and cons even when there is 
a certain amount of information because of the absence of theoretical 
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knowledge and analytical abilities. But in spite of all this, it can be as-
sumed that most citizens have their general (principled) expectations 
from EU accession, expectations that stem from information, half-info-
rmation and interpretations that are conveyed via the media, personal 
experience and informal communication.
The possibility of forming a rational viewpoint (understood as a 
viewpoint founded on a calculation of cost-benefits) concerning entry 
into the EU depends to a very great extent on the atmosphere in which 
a decision is made, that is, on the vigour and character of public debate 
about the topic. When we speak of public debate, it is important to dis-
tinguish public debates among stakeholder groups and experts and pub-
lic debate that the ordinary person can take part in and can understand. 
The first kind of public debate is important and essential, but has little 
effect on the formation of citizen viewpoints. The second kind, which 
we might call public debates in front of the citizens and aimed at them 
is much more important for the formation of public opinion about EU 
membership. The vigour of public debates performed in front of the 
public to date (meaning above all else debates in the media) concerning 
the importance and consequences of EU accession has been relatively 
slight, and they have been mainly of a superficial and generalised na-
ture. We can expect in consequence that the views and expectations of 
citizens themselves are also relatively generalised and hazy, and that 
they are more under the influence of political point-scoring than of se-
rious discussion and rational cost-benefit analysis. 
The objective of the present paper is to analyse current expec-
tations of people in Croatia about the harms and benefits for them per-
sonally and for the country as a whole from EU accession and to es-
tablish just how consistent they are and to what extent they explain the 
current viewpoints. We are also interested in the relation between con-
crete and general (principled) expectations, at a personal and a nation-
al level. The goal is better to understand the mechanism of expectation 
formation, and to define how much expectations are influenced by gen-
eral and superficial impressions, and how much the consequence of an 
analysis of changes in individual aspects of social and economic life. 
An understanding of the character and structure of citizen expectations 
can clearly indicate the need to step up public debate in front of and for 
the citizens and the directions in which such a debate should be led. If 
it should be shown that the views of citizens are generalised, and that 
concrete expectations have no strong influence on the creation of view-
points about EU accession, this might be understood as a clear evalua-
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tion of the previous efforts of government and the line ministry to pro-
vide public information.
Also discussed in the paper are the factors that influence the 
general expectations of respondents, as well as concrete analyses of 
harms and benefits in given areas, primarily from the perspective of 
political viewpoints. We are interested how much principles expecta-
tions of profits and losses from EU accession are in fact rationalisations 
of other motivations for supporting or not supporting EU entry. For the 
purpose of analysing hypotheses concerning general expectations as 
expression of a rationalisation of political viewpoints, we decided to 
measure perceptions of the attitude of the EU to Croatia. This is above 
all concerned with cooperation with the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the hypothesis being that such 
pressures lead to a conviction that the EU does not accept us, which in 
turn produces the reaction in which EU accession is rejected.
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE 
UTILITARIAN APPROACH TO EXPLAINING 
THE ATTITUDES TO MEMBERSHIP OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION
The utilitarian approach to an explanation of public support for 
European integration is one of the most highly-investigated theoreti-
cal perspectives and hence appears in several variants. In the first one, 
which we will call objective, the focus is directed on immediate eco-
nomic gains that individual groups will have from the integration pro-
cesses. It can be hypothesised that in any society certain groups can be 
identified that have a greater immediate benefit than others, as well as 
groups that will have to pay heavier losses. In line with this hypoth-
esis, and with the theoretical model of economically motivated vot-
ing behaviour, it is expected that between these there will be an impor-
tant difference in support to European integration (Gabel and Palmer, 
1995; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998). Groups that can be 
supposed to have greater benefits from the integration processes, be-
cause they will be more competitive in the single market, are relative-
ly young, well educated and have higher social and professional posi-
tions, with higher incomes. On the other hand, people who have less 
education, manual workers and persons with lower incomes will have 
167
more harms than benefits from the process of European integration (be-
cause of their lower direct competitiveness), and it is expected that they 
will accordingly be less inclined to support the integration processes 
(Gabel and Palmer, 1995). By way of adjustment of this model of ex-
planation so it can fit the conditions of the transitional countries, Tuck-
er, Pacek and Berinsky (2002) offer a theory about transition winners 
and losers. Transition winners are defined as those groups that have 
profited from the transition processes, who have enjoyed benefits from 
the concomitant economic and political reforms. The transitional losers 
are those groups that have suffered negative consequences of transition-
al reforms.i The second variant of the utilitarian explanation is based on 
a subjective evaluation of the economic situation (Gabel and Whitten, 
1998) and an evaluation of the potential personal harms and benefits 
in the case of a country’s accession to the EU (Nelsen and Guth, 2000; 
Ehin, 2001). Here the main emphasis is placed on perception instead of 
on the objective position of a person in the social structure and hence 
it is called subjective. Research in the Baltic countries shows that it 
is possible to predict views on integration more precisely on the ba-
sis of expectations of personal losses or benefits than on the basis of 
personal competitiveness as measured by social-professional position. 
This tends to lead to the conclusion that the subjective dimension of ex-
pectations is independent of the objective market position of the person 
(Ehin, 2001).
In essence, the utilitarian model of explanation does not stick 
to economic arguments alone. Cichowski (2000) also includes in this 
group of explanations arguments that take for granted that entry into 
the EU means, for transition countries, a guarantee of the continuation 
of political reforms and political stability, that is the guarantee that to-
talitarian and communist regimes have been abandoned forever. From 
this point of departure, researchers in some eastern European countries 
have investigated the relation between satisfaction with democracy and 
support to democratisation and development of the free market as pre-
dictors of support to European integration (Mishler and Rose, 1997; 
Cichowski, 2000).
The utilitarian model of explaining public support for European 
integration in more recent time has met with two-pronged criticisms. 
The first criticism emphasises political factors, above all from the point 
of view of the impact of the perception of the national government and 
national institutions and party affiliation, which is a continuation of a 
line of reasoning familiar earlier in the older members. Thus Cichowski 
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(2000) demonstrates that party preferences are a key factor in the ex-
planation of support in five of the new members of the EU just before 
accession. In other words, entry into the EU is more often supported 
by pro-European voters, and less by voters of eurosceptic parties.ii The 
great drawback of this argument is that it is impossible to see what is 
cause and what is effect in connection with party affiliation and views 
concerning European integration. The existence of such a correlation 
does not exclude the possibility that in the background of political in-
clinations there is some hidden utilitarian orientation in the sense that 
groups that have greater benefits from the integration processes will 
have more positive views on European integration and hence will sup-
port pro-European parties. A second type of political counter-argument 
to the utilitarian explanation is provided by Sànchez-Cuenca (2000), 
who suggests that there is a strong correlation between the perception 
of national and supranational institutions and views about European in-
tegration. In a situation in which citizens have a highly positive view 
about national institutions and a bad view of supranational (European) 
institutions there is a greater likelihood of a negative viewpoint about 
European integration and vice versa. As in the previous line of reason-
ing, here too it can be noticed that the viewpoint concerning national 
and supranational institutions can be the consequence of a utilitarian 
analysis of the consequences of membership.
The other line of criticism stresses the importance of national 
identity, national exclusiveness and openness to other cultures (McLar-
en, 2002). The EU does not after all mean just free trade and economic 
integration, but it has, increasingly, a cultural and symbolic dimension, 
as well as a political, in the sense of impacts on national identity and 
sovereignty. McLaren (2002) showed that pursuant to openness to oth-
er cultures the strength of support for the EU can be predicted extreme-
ly well, while Carey (2002) showed that the attitude to the EU is con-
ditioned by a feeling of national identity almost just as much by utili-
tarian motivations (see Štulhofer, 2006). But irrespective of the critical 
attitudes to utilitarian explanations of public support for the EU, most 
investigations have shown that such considerations do play an impor-
tant role in the process of explicating public support for European inte-
gration and trust in the EU.
Some methodological and epistemological criticisms may be di-
rected at the utilitarian model or the various versions of it, criticisms 
that are not to be found in the literature to any great extent. The objec-
tive version of the utilitarian model can be criticised for starting out 
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from the assumption that certain groups support EU membership more 
than others because they would be more competitive on the common 
market, without convincing and direct proofs being given to show that 
these groups really are more competitive and that membership of their 
country in the EU will bring them direct benefit. It is particularly du-
bious when the main argument is derived only pursuant to correlations 
of levels of education, income levels and professional status on the one 
hand and views among EU membership on the other.iii It could easily 
be shown that the same groups could be more or less well-disposed to 
EU membership for other reasons, such as a greater amount of social 
capital (Rimac and Štulhofer, 2003) or other kinds of value orientations 
(Ingelhart, 1970). For example, how can it be proved that people with 
higher educations and with higher professional status are more support-
ive of EU membership because of the utilitarian motivations related 
to their supposed greater competitiveness and not because of different 
value orientations, better levels of informedness or some other reason 
again? It may be objected in principle to the subjective version of the 
utilitarian explanation (apart from the choice of indicators in some re-
search – as in Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky, 2002) that it is based on an 
expressed viewpoint that does not necessarily have to be the expression 
of real expectations but can rather be the result of a process of rational-
isation of other motives for anti-European stances. The whole process 
of European integration is presented in public within the framework 
of the primarily economic cost-benefits, and all other kinds of reason-
ing are put out of court as undesirable. This can lead to the rationalisa-
tion of real motivation through the assertion of utilitarian grounds. On 
the other hand, an advantage of the subjective version of the utilitarian 
model is the possibility that some of the members of the public who at 
the moment have no benefit from the transition process can view the 
EU in the light of a saviour that will solve their key problems. Another 
weakness of the utilitarian model is that it is on the whole focused on 
egoistic utilitarianism, at the personal level. Little attention has been 
devoted to a broader understanding of cost-benefits, not focused only 
on interests and benefits of the individual, but on those of the broader 
society or particular groups in it, which can also be a subject for analy-
sis of the advantages and disadvantages of EU membership.
Our point of departure is in the utilitarian model that explains 
people’s views about European integration. One of the most well-re-
searched approaches, it can provide an explanation for the relatively 
fast change of views about an important number of citizens concern-
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ing the accession of their country to the EU. From the evident require-
ment that this model of explanation should be subjected to further criti-
cal interrogation and analysis, in this work we shall test the following 
hypotheses:
•  The general expectations of citizens from EU accession are a power-
ful predictor of support for entry into the Union. Since in most tran-
sition countries this hypothesis proved to be correct, we expect that 
it will also be shown to be so in Croatia. It is a truism to hypothe-
sise that those citizens who expect more positive effects from EU en-
try at a personal or national level will support accession to a greater 
extent. The question arises however as to what part of the variance 
of the total attitude to the EU is explicable by these utilitarian ex-
pectations, and which part remains inexplicable and can be related 
to some of the other models for explaining support to EU member-
ship. The question also arises of whether the attitude to membership 
can be predicted more accurately on the basis of general or concrete 
expectations. Concrete expectations would be closer to the theoreti-
cal model of the utilitarian explanation since it can be supposed that 
they are to a greater extent based on a cost-benefit analysis, and less 
influenced by general impressions or political viewpoints.
•  General expectations from entry into the EU are based on a rational 
evaluation of concrete changes to be expected from entry into the EU, 
above all in aspects that are directly linked with the standard of liv-
ing of the people, such as the prices of goods and services, wage lev-
els and unemployment levels. In the literature relatively little atten-
tion is devoted to the structure of expectations from EU membership 
and to the manner of structuring the system of expectations. First of 
all the general or principled expectations should be distinguished in 
the sense of ratio of harms and benefits, whether at a personal or at a 
national level from concrete expectations in individual life domains. 
The first model implies that on the ground of the general impression 
or some other motives the general expectations are first of all formed, 
which are then projected onto concrete issues and areas of life. The 
second model assumes a rational construction of general expecta-
tions that are the resultants of expected changes in concrete aspects 
of economic or other conditions. Another important issue related to 
the mechanism for the formation of general expectations is the extent 
to which general utilitarian expectations are the consequence of con-
crete expectations relating to the standard of living of the individual, 
to what extent of general economic expectations, and to what extent 
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they are the consequence of expectations that do not at all refer to the 
economic sphere of social life. This hypothesis seems to us to be very 
important for an evaluation of the utilitarian approach to an explana-
tion of support for European integration. Although it is used as one of 
the key indicators for the utilitarian approach to European integration 
in most of the research published to date, there has been a relative-
ly poor analysis of the rationality of general expectations from the 
membership of a country in the EU. The utilitarian model of explana-
tion is primarily founded on the assumption that actors are rational, 
and form their views on this issue on the basis of estimates of their 
own personal interests. This would necessarily entail the assumption 
that general personal expectations are founded on concrete rational 
expectations. In order actually to evaluate the rationality of general 
expectations it would be important to test the extent to which expec-
tations concerning individual concrete areas explicate general expec-
tations from EU accession. The relation between general (principled) 
and concrete expectations can also be an indicator of the vigour and 
quality of public debate and the level of people’s information about 
the importance and consequences of EU membership.
•  General expectations are correlated with political views about the 
EU attitude to Croatia. In essence, behind this hypothesis lies the as-
sumption that general and individual expectations from membership 
in the area of economic cost-benefits are actually partially also the 
consequence of the rationalisation of other motives for supporting or 
not supporting membership, particularly political motives. One of the 
motives that might be expressed in this kind of rationalisation is a 
sense of outraged national pride as the result of the political pressures 
of the EU on Croatia.iv Since politicians and analysts rarely openly 
articulate the feeling of hurt national pride as a reason for euroscep-
ticism, and do not clearly express the resistance to such pressures, it 
can be hypothesised that citizens rationalise this feeling, if it does ex-
ist, through other forms of reasoning. We can assume that such a ra-
tionalisation will primarily be expressed through utilitarian expecta-
tions, because this is the dominant discourse in public debate about 
the entry of Croatia into the EU. Although the aspect of injured na-
tional pride in the literature has not been analysed to any great ex-
tent, we think that in the case of Croatia and of other countries from 
the former Yugoslavia it could have an important impact on the gen-
eral attitude to association, yet mediated through the rationalisation 
mechanism described also upon utilitarian expectations from entry 
into the EU.v
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In order to test out these hypotheses a separate investigation was 
carried out on a two-stage, stratified, probabilistic sample of 1,000 cit-
izens above the age of 15 as part of the omnibus survey of the Puls 
agency.vi The sample taken statistically significantly deviated from the 
structure of the overall population because of the level of education, 
which was adjusted by weighting of the sample (the method of rim 
weighting was used). This deviation was caused by the refusal bias, the 
rate of refusal being about 40%. The field part of the survey was car-
ried out in February 2006. 
We posed six questions by which we collected the necessary 
data for testing the hypotheses, along with the standard demographic 
questions. As indicator of general viewpoint of citizens to EU entry the 
following question was used: Taking it all in all, do you personally sup-
port the accession of Croatia to the EU or not? This indicator was se-
lected as a simple and direct manner of measuring stances towards ac-
cession. It does not involve additional factors and subject characteris-
tics that might affect answers to the questions, as is the case concerning 
the question about voting in any referendum there might be. The ref-
erendum question actually contains a quantification of the intention of 
the respondent to vote in such a referendum which might lead to a cer-
tain distortion of response from that part of the electorate that does not 
go to the polling stations.
To measure general expectations from entry into the EU, two 
questions were used, similar to the standard questions used in Euroba-
rometer research, often the main source of data for testing out hypoth-
eses related to the influence of utilitarian factors on the understanding 
of attitudes to EU integration.vii One question was asked about personal 
expectations: Do you think that you personally will have more benefit 
or more harm from the accession of Croatia to the EU? and one con-
cerning expectations at a national level: Do you think that Croatia will 
have more benefits or more harm from the accession of Croatia to the 
EU? We expected respondents to evaluate their own personal and gen-
eral social benefits and harms from entry into the EU separately. For 
both questions, the same scale with five points expressing the expected 
beneficial and harmful consequences.
As one of the objectives of the paper was to check out the con-
crete structure of expectations that were concealed behind principled 
expectations at a personal and national level, a special instrument was 
173
developed for the measurement of concrete expectations. For twenty-
two different aspects of social and economic life in which the impact 
of EU accession could be expected, subjects were asked to evaluate the 
extent of the impact and the consequences to the life of the average citi-
zens. A five-point scale was used, from “Will deteriorate considerably” 
to “Will improve considerably”.  
Table 1 Groups of concrete expectations*
Quality of life Liberalisation of 
commerce and 
migration
Working 
of national 
institutions
General 
economic 
expectations
Level of crime 
(0.74)
Sale of Croatian 
ﬁrms to foreigners
(-0.85)
Working of state 
of law (0.83)
Development 
of farming  
(-0.83)
Risk of terrorism 
(0.69)
Sale of Croatian 
real estate to 
foreigners (-0.85)
Efﬁcacy of civil
service (0.73)
Export of 
Croatian 
products and 
services (-0.74)
Job security  
(0.66)
Import of foreign 
products (-0.80)
General level 
of democracy 
(0.70)
Opportunity 
to produce 
domestic food 
products (-0.69)
Cost of healthcare 
services (0.65)
Immigration from 
less developed 
countries (-0.74)
Defence 
capacity of the 
country (0.60)
Development 
of the economy  
(-0.65)
Price of goods and 
services (0.65)
Emigration of 
young abroad  
(-0.67)
Level of 
corruption 
in public 
institutions 
(0.58)
Wages and 
salaries (-0.55)
Level of 
unemployment 
(0.64)
Development of 
economy (0.56)
Level of 
unemployment 
(-0.49)
Level of social 
security (0.53)
Wages and salaries 
(0.51)
* Factor structure matrix after oblimin transformation (saturation)
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This kind of approach is necessary because change in a given 
area does not necessarily mean an improvement or a deterioration, rath-
er depends on the value- and interest-laden evaluation of the respon-
dent. For example, the migration of the young abroad can be a negative 
or positive consequence, depending on the personal preferences of the 
subject. Areas were chosen such as to cover the most important of the 
dimensions that, in public debate, were considered to be likely to be af-
fected by EU accession. These areas mostly relate to people’s standard 
of living and generally to economic conditions. Apart from these areas, 
there were also areas relating to the working of government institutions 
and other areas of society.
In order to reduce the amount of data and make them suitable for 
further analysis, factor analysis was carried out on the concrete expec-
tations with the use of an oblique oblimin transformation. Four groups 
of areas were picked out with respect to the correlation of expectations 
in each of them.viii The groups brought together areas that were (i) pri-
marily related to personal living standard and eventual personal risks of 
the subject, (ii) primarily related to liberalisation of commerce and in-
vestment as well as population migration, (iii) with their effects related 
to the function of national institutions and (iv) economic expectations 
not directly linked to the quality of life of the individual citizen. This 
kind of structure suggests the conclusion that the expectations of Croa-
tian citizens are relatively logically and rationally structured. 
In order to be able to test out the hypothesis vis-à-vis political 
viewpoints and concrete and general utilitarian expectations from entry 
into the EU, we added a question designed to elicit perception of EU at-
titudes to Croatia. We chose this dimension of political views because 
of the frequently voiced hypothesis that some of the citizens of Croatia 
interpret the demands of the EU for cooperation with the ICTY, region-
al collaboration and other, similar, political demands through the prism 
of danger to national pride, out of which, by way of reaction, euroscep-
ticism is produced. This dimension is operationalised through six state-
ments, four of which express views about EU attitudes in the context of 
regional politics and the Homeland Warix, while two are concerned in 
general with an evaluation of the justification of the demands the EU 
is making on Croatia,x to which a five point scale of agreement asso-
ciated. In the factor analysis of these six assertions, two factors were 
formed, the first of which is primarily formed by statements about the 
attitude of the EU to Croatia in the context of regional politics and atti-
tudes to the Homeland War, and a second to claims relating to an evalu-
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ation of the requirements that the EU is making with respect to Croatia.xi 
The reliability of the first factor is 0.8 and of the second 0.6, which can 
be considered satisfactory. The latent scales formed in this way were 
employed in further analyses.xii
RESULTS
Predictions of views about entry into the European 
Union on the foundation of general expectations
The main reason behind a given country wishing to join the EU 
lies in the expected positive consequences for the functioning of gov-
ernment and the standard of living of the people. The main resource for 
making a utilitarianly grounded decision as to whether to support or 
not the accession of Croatia to the EU should be an estimate of wheth-
er membership will bring more harms or more benefits, whether at a 
personal or a national level. The results of this investigation show that 
Croatian citizens think membership in the EU will result much more 
in harms to them personally and to the country as a whole than in ben-
efits. The proportion of respondents who thought that positive conse-
quences on personal life would be preponderant was only 21%, or 24% 
for the overall impact at the national level. As against this, as many as 
40% thought that the consequences would be mainly deleterious for 
them personally, and 45% for Croatia as a whole. As could be expe-
cted, views about the consequences for Croatia and for personal life 
were correlated. The correlation of these two variables comes to 0.79 
(p<0.01), which puts it in the order of large correlations and indicates 
the strong link between expectations at personal and national levels. 
The high correlation between these two dimensions is on the whole un-
derstandable because the consequences for a large number of individu-
als are also consequences at the national level, or consequences at the 
national level cannot avoid having direct or indirect consequences for 
most individuals. But still, to some extent there is a distinction between 
the two dimensions, and it is not possible with any certainty to state 
which of the two levels of utilitarianism has the greatest effect on the 
formation of views. Because of the high reciprocal correlation, in the 
further analysis, both dimensions of the explanation are used.xiii
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Table 2  General/principled expectations from the accession of Croatia  
to the European Union at a personal and at the national level (in %)
National level Personal level
Much more harm than beneﬁt 21.8 18.4
A bit more harm than beneﬁt 24.4 21.2
Equal amounts of harm and beneﬁt 20.0 27.6
A bit more beneﬁt than harm 18.7 16.3
Much more beneﬁt than harm 5.5 4.5
Don’t know 9.6 12.0
Total 100.0 100.0
A logistic regression analysis shows that there is a strong corre-
lation between general expectations at a personal and a national level 
and a general view about Croatian accession to the EU.xiv Such a result 
is not an astounding discovery, but it does confirm the correlation of 
the first hypothesis between expected harms and benefits and the over-
all attitude about EU membership. The correlation between general ex-
pectations and the general attitude about EU membership can be seen 
in table 3. 
Table 3  Comparison of utilitarian expectations with general viewpoint about 
Croatian membership in the European Union
N Don’t support Support Don’t know/ 
no opinion
Whole sample 1,000 47.4 39.4 13.2
Croatia
 More harm than beneﬁt 462 76.7 15.1 8.2
 Equal harm and beneﬁt 200 35.0 46.5 18.5
 More beneﬁt than harm 242 9.6 87.7 2.7
 Don’t know 96 26.9 20.3 52.7
Personal
 More harm than beneﬁt 396 77.8 15.5 6.7
 Equal harm and beneﬁt 276 39.1 45.2 15.7
 More beneﬁt than harm 208 11.9 85.5 2.6
 Don’t know 120 27.4 25.4 47.2
It can be seen quite clearly that over three quarters of respon-
dents who support EU accession expect more benefits than harms for 
themselves personally, as well as at the level of the country as a whole, 
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while over 85% of those who are against entry have the opposite ex-
pectations, that is, they expect more harms than benefits to themselves 
personally as well as to the country as a whole. But this result does not 
necessarily mean a confirmation of the utilitarian model of explaining 
support for European integration. It is possible that the utilitarian ex-
pectations expressed in terms of harms and benefits are just a ratio-
nalisation of some other reasons on the basis of which the basic stance 
about Croatian membership in the EU has been formed.
Prediction of views about accession to the 
European Union on the basis of concrete 
expectations
At the level of concrete expectations, in each of the twenty-two 
areas analysed, most of the subjects had pronouncedly negative expec-
tations. In two thirds of the areas, more subjects thought that the chang-
es would lead to negative consequences for the lives of the population 
of Croatia. By far the most negative effects are expected in the matter 
of the prices of goods and services, particularly of healthcare services, 
which we surveyed separately.xv Interestingly, in third place in terms of 
expectation of negative consequences lies “ability to produce domes-
tic food products” (for example, cottage cheese, sour cream and cured 
meat). The view that these changes would considerably diminish the 
quality of life of the average inhabitant of Croatia suggests that citizens 
still do not have full information and that they think only within the 
terms that have been foisted on them at the moment through the me-
dia. The subjects expected the most positive changes in the working of 
a state of law, efficacy of the civil service and the development of the 
economy. Apart from these three, there are four more aspects in which 
more pollees expect positive than negative changes. 
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Table 4  Expectations of citizens from accession to the European Union  
in 22 aspects of social and economic lifexvi
 Will 
deteriorate
Won’t 
change
Will 
improve
Don’t 
know
Difference
Working of state of law 7.3 40.8 34.1 17.7 26.8
Development of the 
economy
13.3 36.5 33.7 16.5 20.4
Efﬁcacy of civil service 10.3 43.3 28.5 17.9 18.2
Export of Croatian goods 
and services
17.5 32.4 33.0 17.2 15.5
General level of democracy 8.8 46.7 23.9 20.7 15.1
Defence capability of 
country
7.7 48.7 21.5 22.1 13.8
Level of corruption in public 
institutions
17.4 42.7 21.9 18.1 4.5
Development of farming 25.9 32.9 24.7 16.5 -1.2
Emigration of young people 26.9 32.0 22.3 18.8 -4.6
Level of social security 26.3 37.1 19.5 17.0 -6.8
Import of foreign products 31.0 29.3 23.7 16.0 -7.3
Wages and incomes 30.3 35.4 20.0 14.3 -10.3
Level of unemployment 34.6 34.5 16.5 14.3 -18.1
Immigration from less 
developed countries
34.7 28.9 15.0 21.4 -19.7
Sale of Croatian ﬁrms to
foreigners
41.8 23.9 17.6 16.8 -24.2
Job security 36.1 35.6 11.0 17.3 -25.1
Sale of Croatian real estate 
to foreigners
42.6 23.6 16.4 17.4 -26.2
Risk from terrorism 39.1 31.1 12.3 17.5 -26.8
Level of crime 39.3 31.3 11.8 17.5 -27.5
Ability to produce domestic 
food products such as 
cottage cheese, sour cream 
and cured meats
41.3 30.4 11.7 16.6 -29.6
Price of goods and services 54.2 20.0 13.0 12.8 -41.2
Price of healthcare services 54.4 21.8 10.4 13.4 -44.0
Logistic analysis shows that on the basis of concrete expecta-
tions it is possibly only rather poorly to predict support for member-
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ship in the EU. Only about 65% of cases are exactly assigned, which is 
a relatively small percentage considering that with random choices the 
probability of a correct classification into groups would be about 50%. 
That this is a relatively weak correlation is shown by the coefficient of 
determination, which in this case is only 0.21, if all 22 aspects are in-
cluded into the analysis or 0.17 if the latent dimensions of concrete ex-
pectations are included.xvii
With literally all the analysed aspects one can see a difference 
in prediction of changes and the effect of these changes between those 
who support and those who do not support EU accession. This is indi-
cated by the inverted sequence of the logic of thinking as compared to 
expectations of the utilitarian aspect of the definition of views about 
support to integration. It can be assumed, that is, that individuals will 
make decisions about supporting or not supporting entry on the founda-
tion of objective analyses of advantages and disadvantages. If this were 
true, at least in some aspects, both groups of subjects would have the 
same expectations. A real and objective analysis would have to lead to 
more or less concordant results of thinking in at least a few of the indi-
vidual expectations of changes deriving from accession and the results 
of these changes. The fact that subjects who differ in their views about 
support differ from each other in absolutely all the expected conse-
quences suggest that expectations are in fact the consequences of a par-
ti pris. A viewpoint about support is clearly not adopted mainly pursu-
ant to objective analysis of the consequences, but is highly determined 
by some other predictors. On the basis of an attitude towards support 
already formed, the consequences are evaluated in such a way as to jus-
tify the viewpoint. Of course this conclusion does not mean that a de-
cision about support is not based in a certain measure on an objective 
analysis of consequences, but only that other elements too affect it to a 
very great degree.
The relation between general  
and concrete expectations
Regression analysis in which concrete expectations are used as 
predictors for general expectations show a weak correlation between 
the two levels of expectation. With the use of concrete expectations, it 
is possible to predict only about 22% of the variance of the general ex-
pectations.xviii It is possible that some important areas have been omit-
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ted from the list of measured concrete areas, but since a relatively large 
number of areas were included in the research, it is hard to believe that 
an increased number of areas would significantly increase the corre-
lation between the concrete and the principled expectations. All those 
aspects that are stated in the literature as being crucial are certainly in-
cluded into the areas measured, that is, the economic aspects related to 
personal standard of living, and aspects that relate to the continuation 
of political and institutional reforms. This kind of result suggests the 
conclusion that principled expectations are founded on concrete expec-
tations only relatively weakly. Apart from this they are not to any great 
extent the result of rational calculation and an informed estimate of 
harms-benefits in individual areas and aspects of social and economic 
life. Principled expectations are rather the result of a generalised emo-
tional stance or perhaps a stance based on value orientations or politi-
cal views (see Štulhofer, 2006), which would tend to suggest that the 
second hypothesis can be partially discarded. This kind of result can be 
considered evidence of the weak results of public debate, which clearly 
has not helped people clearly to structure their expectations from EU 
accession and pursuant to this to make a rational estimate of the harms 
and benefits, and hence make a more rational decision to support or not 
to support Croatian accession. 
Views about the consequence to personal income and wages and 
the possibility for the production of domestic food products are the best 
predictors of principled expectations. While the importance of expec-
tations that relate to income for the quality of life is inherently intelli-
gible and justified, the prominence of this second aspect is astounding. 
An aspect that in itself is not crucial for the quality of life of the majori-
ty of people has become, pursuant to a single campaign based on main-
ly erroneous premises and insufficiently clear reasoning concerning, or 
provision of information about, European consumer protection rules, is 
positioned as the top topic of an analysis of the consequences of mem-
bership in the EU. The conclusion that must inevitably be drawn here 
is that the crucial influence on ultimate judgments of consequences and 
hence to a certain extent on viewpoints about giving support to acces-
sion will be exerted by the quality and strength of the campaigns man-
aged by the proponents and opponents of accession. The other statisti-
cally significant elements are expectations that relate to the functioning 
of a state of law and the level of corruption in the public institutions.
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Table 5  The impact of individual expectations on principled expectations 
of membership in the European Union (regression analysis)
Beta 
weighting
Direct 
correlation 
with criterion
Percentage 
of variance 
explainedxix
Incomes and wages 0.227 0.342 7.76
Possibility of producing 
domestic food products such as 
cottage cheese, sour cream and 
cured meat
0.234 0.335 7.84
Functioning of a state of law 0.140 0.267 3.74
Level of corruption in public 
institutions
0.118 0.244 2.88
In order to verify the hypothesis about the rationalisation of po-
litical motivation for support or lack of support via utilitarian expec-
tations from entry into the EU, we correlated expectations from entry 
into the EU with views about how the EU was politically treating Croa-
tia. An analysis showed that among these dimensions there was a link, 
but a relatively weak link. Correlation of the factor of the perception of 
the EU attitude to Croatia in the context of the Homeland War/regional 
politics and general expectations comes to 0.26 (p<0.01). Correlation 
of the factor of the justification of EU demands on Croatia and general 
expectations is a bit stronger, but is still in the sphere of small correla-
tions, and comes to 0.35 (p<0.01). The two dimensions of the views 
about the way the EU treats Croatian politically also explain a relative-
ly small part of the variance of general expectations (R2=0.14). These 
results suggest that general expectations are not dominantly dependent 
on political views, or at least not by those political views measured in 
this investigation. Still, if we measure the common effect of political 
views and concrete expectations on general expectations, we will see 
that political views make up almost 40% of the total variance explained 
(27.7%) which is cumulatively explained by factors of political views 
and concrete expectations. A result of this nature means that concrete 
expectations have an only slightly greater impact on the formation of 
general expectations than political views. This shows that the general 
expectations that should be an indicator of a utilitarian attitude towards 
EU accession are in fact not that, or not that alone.
When the correlation of political views about the attitude of the 
EU to Croatia and support to membership is analysed, it will be seen 
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that this dimension explains significantly less of the total variance of 
support to entry into the EU than the general expectations, and as much 
as the concrete expectations in individual aspects of social life. On the 
basis of familiarity with the political viewpoints it is possible correct-
ly to predict the viewpoint about Croatian entry into the EU in 67% of 
the cases. This is approximate to the percentage of accurate prediction 
on the basis of concrete expectations and significantly lower than the 
percentage of correct predictions on the basis of general expectations. 
Such a result shows however that political views are at least as good an 
explanation as the utilitarian approach, as long the utilitarian approach 
is operationalised through concrete expectations, the methodologically 
more correct approach than general expectations, since general expec-
tations to a great extent express a general attitude about the EU, not just 
an analysis of harms and benefits.xx 
CONCLUSIONS
 This paper has endeavoured to verify the hypothesis concerning 
the utilitarian basis of viewpoints on whether Croatian accession to the 
EU should be supported or not, and above all the subjectivist version of 
the utilitarian explanation, which assumes that citizens form their view-
points about European integration on the grounds of expected gains and 
losses for themselves as individuals and for the country as a whole. It is 
assumed that the actors are rational, which implies that they make their 
evaluation on the basis of a more or less detailed analysis of the harms 
and benefits that would accrue to individual aspects of personal and so-
cial life on membership.
The results of the investigation bear out the proposition that on 
the basis of general expectations of benefits and harms from EU entry 
it is possible precisely to predict support for EU accession. On the other 
hand, general (principled) expectations are grounded quite weakly on 
concrete expectations about individual aspects of social and economic 
life, being rather the result of generalised impressions about member-
ship in the EU. Only a few of the general expectations can be explained 
by the expectations in the twenty-two concrete areas of social and eco-
nomic life, while most of the general expectations at personal and na-
tional level are not explained by concrete expectations. This is a result 
that clearly indicate two conclusions, one of them essential and one 
methodological. Firstly, viewpoints about entry into the EU are formed 
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at a relatively superficial level, without any great amount of informa-
tion or rational calculation. Just how true this is can be confirmed from 
the fact that one of the strongest predictors of general expectations from 
the group of concrete expectations is the view about the possibility of 
producing domestic food products, which is itself the outcome of a su-
perficial and on the whole unfounded public campaign. Thus the gen-
eral expectations on the basis of which it is possible to predict the ul-
timate viewpoint concerning entry into the EU are much more formed 
according to impulse than they are the outcome of rational evaluation.
This is to a large extent the result of the relatively low num-
ber and low quality of public debates about the consequences and sig-
nificance of Croatian entry into the EU. There are very few public de-
bates that are carried on in front of members of the public and that are 
aimed at helping people to form and articulate their views, irrespective 
of whether these are negative or positive. Previous endeavours to in-
form people were on the whole aimed at providing basic information 
about the institutional system of the EU. Passive forms of communica-
tion have been mostly used, such as brochures, leaflets, web sites, quiz-
zes and workshops for the young, which is not appropriate for getting 
to the majority of the population. This population is on the whole not 
interested in topics related to the institutions of the EU and is not ready 
to put in the amount of effort that such passive forms of communication 
require. Citizens on the whole do not want, after a hard day at work, 
to read brochures, no matter how interesting, or to comb the Internet 
for news about the EU. This cuts down the effect of such activities on 
the general population. On the other hand, information provided by 
the media and politicians can be judged as being diffuse and confused. 
There are some media which do try to inform people about the EU (the 
special broadcasts of Croatian TV and Radio 101, for example, spe-
cialised pages of T-portal), but these efforts are few and far between, 
scattered at the end of broadcasting schedules or spaces. Special broad-
casts tend to appear every two to three weeks, at non-prime times. This 
kind of topic is not at the centre of the media, nor does it thus reach 
any significant proportion of the population. On the other hand, these 
same media often have stories that are over-generalised, quite often the 
product of the ignorance and error of the journalist, and often with ad-
mixtures of scandal mongering and gutter journalism, the result being 
that one and the same medium will send messages of varying qualities; 
those that explain, and those that confound. Politicians adapt their com-
munications about the consequences of accession from case to case, 
184
on the whole depending on short-term political needs. When it suits 
them, politicians can be very concrete and precise, and in other situ-
ations very unfocused and diffuse, clouding the issues. All this results 
in an absence of adequately qualitative, concrete and clear information 
and, what is most important, the explanation and demystification of in-
dividual aspects of the common policy of the EU (for example, why 
the EU is interested in cheese and cream, domestic slaughtering and 
the production of home-made plum brandy). Naturally, the function of 
public debates about entry into the EU is not just to give citizens the 
information on the basis of which they can make a rational decision, for 
such a decision cannot be made just on the basis of rational elements. It 
will necessarily have value and political elements, and public debates 
are equally important for their formation and definition, for in them-
selves they are not clear either to citizens, politicians or experts (with 
or without inverted commas). The value and political connotations of 
such huge social decisions are also formed in the process of public de-
bate. Our impression is that these also are not at the moment clear and 
well formed in Croatia, and that at this level we are more in arrears than 
we are with respect to knowledge of facts about the EU.
The second, methodological, conclusion, which derives from 
the weak correlation of general and concrete expectations, is that gen-
eral expectations cannot be used as indicator of a utilitarian basis for 
stances about the EU. General expectations are clearly more founded 
on impulsive and situational relations than on a rational evaluation of 
personal and collective interests and the benefits and harms. The in-
vestigation showed that the general evaluation of personal and collec-
tive harms and benefits to a small extent also represents a rationalisa-
tion of political views about the attitude of the EU to Croatia. The need 
for rationalisation of political motives for not supporting entry into the 
EU can be provoked by the general public discourse in which there is 
discussion of membership, and which is dominantly framed in the lan-
guage of benefits and harms, effects on the economy and standard of 
living. From the sphere of political viewpoints, in this paper we have 
analysed the influence of the perception of the attitude of the EU to 
Croatia as the most important aspect of the political dimension of Cro-
atian joining the EU. The issue of the treatment of the Homeland War, 
the war-crimes trials relating to the Croatian army and the associated 
issue of cooperation with the ICTY and the attitude of Croatia to the 
other countries of former Yugoslavia became during the last decade key 
political issues that determine the great majority of other political is-
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sues in Croatia (Bagić, 2006). It is these political matters that constitute 
the political dimension of Croatian association with the EU and these 
often produce (or produced until quite recently) disputes between Cro-
atia and the EU. Hence it is justified to assume that these questions will 
be a potential rival to the utilitarian explanation for (lack of) support for 
entry into the EU, as well as an occasion for a possible rationalisation 
via general expectations.
It is a fact that on the basis of concrete expectations it is not pos-
sible accurately to predict support for EU accession, and their predic-
tiveness is the same as the predictiveness that the political viewpoints 
have, which leads to the conclusion that the utilitarian model of expla-
nation is equally as valid as that based on political viewpoints. This in 
turn suggests that a decision about EU accession from the perspective 
of Croatian citizens, much more than a cold and rational decision based 
on an analysis of losses and gains, should be seen as a very complex 
social and political phenomenon through which various aspects of the 
current social, political and economic reality of Croatia are refracted.
*  The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions 
as well as Katarina Ott for her committed efforts to make this paper more readable 
and understandable. The authors contributed equally to the paper and are given in 
alphabetical order.
i  With the difference that Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky (2002) differently operationalise 
the concepts of winner and loser as against the traditional version of this behaviour 
model. While Gabel and Palmer (1995) used the objective features of the subject 
(education level, social and professional status, income level) to describe groups 
that beneﬁted from European integration, the ﬁrst group of authors operationalised
their concepts of transitional winners and losers via the subjective impression about 
the change in personal ﬁnancial situation in the previous 12 months and expected
changes in the coming 12 months. This kind of operationalisation of theoretical 
concepts can be criticised because the concept about positive or negative ﬁnancial
moves in the last 12 months does not exactly have to mark the transition winners and 
losers, particularly when the research is carried out ten years after the beginning of 
transition. 
ii  The concept of party afﬁliation here should be considered provisionally, since it
does not relate to membership of a party, rather the support for a given party at the 
moment the inquiry was carried out.
iii  It is worth pointing out that in some investigations other measures of attitudes to 
European integration are used.
iv  The authors use this concept as an analytical category and its use does not express 
their own judgement about the policy of the EU to Croatia and the countries of the 
region.
v  We think there is a signiﬁcant difference between a feeling of national identity or
cultural openness (enclosedness), which have been investigated as predictors of 
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views about membership in the EU (Carey, 2002; Štulhofer, 2006) and the feeling 
of outraged national pride. This feeling can appear in persons who do not have 
a particularly marked feeling of national identity, and can as such have a very 
important role in the formation of views about membership of the EU among persons 
for whom national identity is averagely important, while among the same people, if 
a feeling of outraged national pride develops as a consequence of political pressures 
from the EU, then resistance to membership can be expected as a reaction.
vi  The authors would like to thank Puls agency for its kindness and the ﬁnancing of the
implementation of this investigation.
vii  Eurobarometer is the name of regular public opinion surveys in member countries 
and candidate countries, carried out for the European Commission. For more 
about these surveys, and the results, see: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_
en.htm.
viii  The extracted factors explain 54% of total variance.
ix  Statements: The EU is not pushing Croatia into the Balkans; the EU is not partially 
responsible for degrading the dignity of the Homeland War; the EU is not attempting 
to equate the roles of Croatia and Serbia in the recent war; the EU is not treating 
Croatia worse than other countries in the region.
x  Statements: Most of the requirements of the EU are for our own good; the EU is 
treating Croatia decently, and asking of us only what is essential.
xi  Factor analysis was carried out with component model and with perpendicular 
transformation.
xii  Reliability of the scale tested with Chrombach’s alpha coefﬁcient.
xiii  A signiﬁcant factor was extracted with factor analysis, on which both variables were
saturated at 0.95 and through which 89% of variance as explained, the reliability 
being 0.88. Of course, no new information is gained with this kind of factor analysis 
between two variables. Factor analysis is carried out only so that the latent 
dimension created in this way can be used in further analysis.
xiv  R2=0.55 and 81% of correctly distributed subjects into the appropriate category of 
criteria on the basis of value in the predictor variable.
xv  This result can be the consequence of the fact that at the moment the research was 
carried out a public debate was going on about reforms in the healthcare system that 
might mean much more expensive healthcare services to users, which it would seem 
people connected with entry into the EU.
xvi  The scale was recoded from a ﬁve-point to a three-point scale for the sake of easier
readability of results and easier interpretation.
xvii  Coefﬁcient of determination is derived from the coefﬁcient of correlation and
marks the strength of the correlation among the variables. It ranges between 0 and 
1, and the closer to one the stronger the correlation among the phenomena being 
compared.
xviii  In the analysis of data a linear regression analysis was used with the stepwise 
method. If a regression analysis is carried out on concrete particles of concrete 
expectations 22% of general expectations are explained, or 20% if the analysis is 
carried out on the latent dimensions of concrete expectations.
xix  Obtained as the product of the standardised beta weight and the direct correlation of 
predictor with criterion, in line with the regression formula: R2=ß1*r1+ ß2*r2 + ß3*r3 
+ …
xx  As proved by the weak correlation of concrete and general expectations. 
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